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In this article, metaphors for reading and meaning in Latin are considered from the perspective 
of conceptual metaphor theory. The focus is on (1) ascriptions of agency and personhood to 
inanimate entities such as words, texts, and books, and how the notions of (2) the container 
and (3) the path help to structure Latin descriptions of the relationship between words and 
ideas. The article closes with a case study of the noun intentio. By demonstrating the existence 
of these metaphors in Latin (building on previous scholarship), the article augments the 
historical and transcultural evidence for conceptual metaphor theory, further substantiates the 
theory’s explanatory value, and illustrates the dangers of taking English metaphors of meaning 
and intention inherited from Latin at face value.
Keywords: Latin metaphors; metaphor theory; reading and meaning.
RESUMO
Neste artigo, metáforas em latim para leitura e significado são consideradas sob a perspectiva da 
teoria conceitual da metáfora. O foco é  (1) atribuição de atividade e personificação de entidades 
inanimadas como palavras, textos e livros, e como as noções de (2) recipiente e (3) caminho 
ajudam a estruturar as descrições latinas da relação entre palavras e ideias. O artigo se encerra 
com o estudo de caso do substantivo intentio. Ao demonstrar a existência dessas metáforas em 
latim (trabalhando a partir de estudos precedentes), o artigo fornece mais evidência histórica e 
transcultural para a teoria conceitual da metáfora, além de comprovar o valor explanatório da 
teoria, e ilustra os perigos de se tomar literalmente as metáforas em inglês, herdadas do latim, 
para as ideias de sentido e intenção.
Palavras-chave: metáforas em latim; teoria da metáfora; leitura e sentido.
INTRODUCTION
The figurative aspects of descriptions of reading and meaning – the way 
characterizations of books, grammar, and signification are built on metaphorical 
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and metonymical bases – are well known.1 This article will focus on the extent 
to which these metaphors are reflected in the Latin language, an area where 
excellent work has been done in the past decade or so. William Short has shown 
how conceptual metaphor, described in nuce later in this paper, structures 
abstract target domains such as ideas in Latin by reference to our embodied 
state;2 Short notes, for example, how Roman authors spoke of “entering a 
plan”, “departing from a plan”, “standing by a plan”, or “dragging others into 
a plan” via the metaphor ideas are locations.3 Short has also demonstrated 
how the source-path-goal schema serves to structure mistakenness in Latin: 4 
mistakenness is described as “wandering” (error), i.e. the goal of mental motion 
is not attained. These contributions clearly have relevance to the Roman (and 
modern) conceptions of meaning and intention. When it comes to reading, 
Timothy O’Sullivan, drawing on the work of William Johnson, has pointed 
out the metaphorical background of passages such as the following from 
Quintilian:5
1. lectio libera est nec ut actionis impetus transcurrit, sed repetere saepius licet, siue 
dubites siue memoriae penitus adfigere uelis. Repetamus autem et tractemus et, ut 
cibos mansos ac prope liquefactos demittimus quo facilius digerantur, ita lectio non 
cruda sed multa iteratione mollita et uelut [ut] confecta memoriae imitationique 
tradatur.
“Reading is free, nor does it run past us like the rush of oral delivery, but it 
is possible to go back through it several times, whether you are in doubt or 
whether you wish to fix it deeply in your memory. We may return to it and 
examine it, and just as we swallow food chewed and nearly liquefied so that 
it may be digested more easily, thus [our reading] should not be passed to the 
memory and imitation raw, but softened and, to use a word, digested by much 
iteration” (Quint. Inst. 10.1.19).6
 
O’Sullivan notes the presence of slightly contrasting metaphors concerning 
movement in the first sentence – on the one hand, the reading itself (lectio) is 
described as rushing past the stationary reader (transcurrit), on the other the 
1 See e.g. ZANKER (2016). This article is a reworked version of a presentation delivered 
at the conference “Lector in fabula: leitura e significação entre antigos e modernos” at Unicamp 
on March 14th, 2018. I am grateful to Isabella Tardin Cardoso, Luciano César Garcia Pinto, 
and William Short for discussing its themes with me (the latter via email).
2 See SHORT (2008).
3 See SHORT (2008), and below.
4 See SHORT (2013a).
5 See O’SULLIVAN (2015), 112-114 (113); cf. JOHNSON (2010), pp. 17-31, on how 
the format of the scroll impacted on ancient reading.
6 Translations are my own.
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reader is the one who does the moving (repetere). It is additionally clear from 
what follows that there are further metaphors for reading too, such as that of 
digestion.7 The scope of this paper, however, is limited to three aspects of this 
vast subject (i.e. ancient metaphors for reading and meaning): the first topic 
will be (1) the metaphorical ascription of agency to inanimate entities such as 
words, books, and texts; there follow sections on how the notions of the (2) 
container/location and (3) path inform Roman conceptions of what texts 
are and what they do. To close, we shall see how the path metaphor facilitated 
the creation of a piece of critical terminology that remains important in 
Anglophone scholarship (intentio). 
1. THE ASCRIPTION OF HUMAN QUALITIES TO THE TEXT
In a classic experiment undertaken in the early 1940’s by the psychologists 
Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel,8 thirty-four students were shown a video 
featuring the apparent movement and interaction of three different geometric 
shapes (a large triangle, a small triangle, and a small circle) around an oblong 
with a section that appears to open and shut like a door. 
Fig. 1. Recreated still from film used in Heider and Simmel’s experiment.
The “movement” of the shapes was designed to be understandable in 
terms of a story involving love, jealousy, and violence, and indeed the great 
majority of the test subjects interpreted the shapes as both animate and 
7 On this, see SHORT (2013b).
8 HEIDER & SIMMEL (1944). The film used in the experiment is widely available on 
the internet. Heider and Simmel’s paper in fact records three different forms of the experiment; 
only the first is referred to here.
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possessing human emotions. Only a single student described the objects in 
geometric terms – and even she slipped up on one occasion by referring to the 
larger triangle as a “he”. In one of the students’ descriptions, the larger triangle 
was described as a “big bully” and a “villain”, while the smaller triangle and 
the circle were described as “innocent young things”, “lovers”, “little triangle 
number two”, “our hero”, “his sweet”, and “sweet circle”.9
The study is an old one, but it does bring into focus two important aspects 
of human cognition – first, that as a species we like to construct narratives in 
order to understand the relationships between things and to link situations 
together in a causal chain that will explain them in human terms; the students 
in the experiment almost universally wanted to describe the movement of the 
geometric shapes in terms of a story involving animate beings. Second, they 
ascribed human emotions and intentionality to the shapes in order to so: the 
students superimposed their understanding of human behavior, and knowledge 
of the narratives and scripts dependent on that behavior, onto objects without 
human minds. Both of these features remain relevant for our understanding of 
human cognition, and also for our understanding of the process of reading and 
interpreting literature – for in descriptions of reading, speakers often turn the 
word, and the medium upon which it is written, into an agent. 
The process whereby the book takes on a mind of its own is a familiar one; 
books, phrases, and words can “want to say” things, for example, in several 
different languages – this occurs in Portuguese with “quer dizer”, for instance 
in the phrase “o que isso quer dizer?”. Such expressions might be classed as 
“metaphorical” – speakers use terms such as “want”, “say”, etc., of books and 
words in ways that are appropriate for things that can want and speak.10 It is 
important to note that these same metaphors can be traced back to an earlier 
phase of human culture – specifically, to a phase of culture that saw both the 
adoption of writing (in Archaic Greece) and the much later adoption of the 
codex in the first centuries AD, which remains the standard form of the book 
to this day. In Latin, for instance, one common way in which to describe what 
something means is via the construction sibi uelle, which literally means “to 
want for oneself ”:
2. quid uolt sibi, Syre, haec oratio?
“What does this statement mean, Syrus?” (Ter. Haut. 615).
In Varro’s investigation of the Latin language from the 1st century BC, 
expressions such as the following are frequently attested, where words and 
texts apparently speak themselves:
9 HEIDER & SIMMEL (1944), p. 247.
10 For previous discussion, see ZANKER (2016).
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3. nam, ut annales dicunt, uouit Opi, Florae, Vedioui Saturnoque, Soli, Lunae...
“…for, as the Annales say, [the Sabine king Titus Tatius] vowed [altars] to 
Ops, Flora, Vediouis and Saturnus, Sol, Luna...” (Varro, Ling. 5.74).11
Words and texts cannot literally want or say things, but speakers 
nevertheless describe them as if they do. At times, they could be more precisely 
characterized: take the following expression from Juvenal’s infamous sixth 
satire, where the poet is attacking women for using lascivious Greek phrases:12
4. quotiens lasciuum interuenit illud
ζωὴ καὶ ψυχή, modo sub lodice loquendis
uteris in turba. quod enim non excitet inguen
uox blanda et nequam? digitos habet... 
“Whenever that sexy ‘Mia vita, mio spirito’ comes up, you are using words in 
public that are only to be spoken under the blanket. For what pelvic area does 
such a charming and naughty expression not arouse? It has fingers…” (Juv. 
6.194-197).
Here, the uox, literally an “utterance” or “expression”, is described as 
having fingers, which foregrounds the specific type of agency involved – the 
utterance is coaxing and lascivious. Such an expression as ζωὴ καὶ ψυχή 
behaves like the woman who supposedly utters it. It is personified – in order 
to describe what the uox does, Juvenal figuratively gives it animation and 
body, and a specific part of the body at that. 
The same thing applies to entire books – in Epistles 1.20, for example, the 
poet Horace famously addresses his own poetry book. The book is described 
as having a will of its own: it seeks to leave the safety of Horace’s home and to 
hurry off to the bookseller’s market in order to be circulated freely around the 
city (and beyond). Later on, Horace suggests, the book will ask itself quid miser 
egi? | quid uolui? (“What did I do, wretch that I am? What did I want?” Hor. 
Epist. 1.20.6-7).13 Such an expanded personification could not have occurred 
without an underlying vocabulary for what texts do that suggested they were 
living beings. The material is abundant, and there is no need to go into it in 
depth here; it must in any case take account of the early Greek material, where 
similar transferences occurring at the beginning of the use of writing may be 
11 Cf. “serpere” et “proserpere” idem dicebant, ut Plautus quod scribit:“quasi proserpens bestia” 
(“serpere ‘to creep’ and proserpere ‘to creep forward’ said/meant the same thing, as that which 
Plautus writes: ‘like a creeping creature’” Varro, Ling. 5.68).
12 The example is mentioned by CAVE (2016), pp. 9-10.
13 For an example to set next to the excerpt from Juvenal above (4), compare the following 
from Mart. 1.35.12-14: quare deposita seueritate | parcas lusibus et iocis rogamus, | nec castrare 
uelis meos libellos (“wherefore with your seriousness set aside, spare my games and jokes, nor 
wish to castrate my little books”).
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observed.14 In sum, if scholars want to understand the figurative aspects of the 
modern attribution of agency to things such as books, it is important to go 
back as far as possible to the moment when they were first applied: that is, to 
the ancient languages.
As mentioned, such expressions are metaphorical – that is, transferred 
on the basis of a perceived similarity. There is a further type of transference, 
however, that blurs the lines between the human being and his or her 
creation: metonymy. For instance, according to the metonymy producer for 
product, speakers can talk about “a Rembrandt” when they mean a painting 
created by the painter Rembrandt, or apply the name of a book’s author to 
the book itself:15
5. “You can find Jane Austen on the top shelf ”. 
The metonymy according to which the author’s name is used for the text 
can certainly be found in early Latin – in the opening of Plautus’ Menaechmi, 
for instance, the character of the Prologue refers to how he is presenting 
Plautus by means of his tongue rather than by means of his hand – that is, 
Plautus is being presented as a play rather than as a person:
6. apporto uobis Plautum, lingua non manu
“I’m bringing you Plautus – by tongue and not by hand” (Plaut. Men. 3).
The polysemy thereby created could be amusing, but it also had more 
serious possibilities: the metonymy became one of the key ways by which 
Roman authors such as Horace (Carm. 3.30) and Ovid, following their 
Greek predecessors, proclaimed their immortality; at the very end of the 
Metamorphoses, for example, Ovid states that he will be recited by readers 
long after he has died:16
14 Equivalents to Latin sibi uelle and dicere (in the usages discussed above) can readily be 
found in Greek ἐθέλειν (“to want”) and λέγειν (“to speak”); for references and discussion, see 
ZANKER (2016), pp. 90-145. For further examples, cf.  ...γιγνώσκομεν γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο φρονεῖ 
ἡμῶν ἡ ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους ἀγωγή “...for we know well that this is what this presentation of us 
to only a few men means” (Th. 5.85); καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἤρετο Ἀρίστανδρον τὸν μάντιν, ὅ τι 
νοοῖ ὁ οἰωνός... (“and Alexander asked the priest Aristandros as to what the bird-sign meant” 
Arr. An. 2.26.4).
15 For discussion, see ZANKER (2016), pp. 247-163. This last instance (5) becomes 
interesting in the case of anaphora, or “referring back”, whereby a book is referred to (under 
certain constraints) by means of the gender of the author: “You can find Jane Austen on the top 
shelf; I think you’ll find her a good read”. See FAUCONNIER (1994 [1985]), p. 5-6.
16 On the relationship between the bodies of Horace and Ovid and their books, see 
FARRELL (1999, 2007).
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7. quaque patet domitis Romana potentia terris,
ore legar populi, perque omnia saecula fama…
“And wherever Roman power expands over the tamed lands, I shall be read by 
the mouth of the people, and [I shall live] as a rumor through all the ages…” 
(Ov. Met. 15.877-878).
Ovid enacts the metonymy with the phrase ore legar populi, a first-person 
version of the metonymy that allows him to suggest that a better part of him 
will live on post mortem;17 of course, no actual consciousness of the poet will 
survive, just his text. Thus, besides the metaphorical personification of texts, 
there is a metonymical substitution available in Latin that further muddies the 
relationship between people and books.
2. CONTAINERS
The material in the previous section has been studied in the past,18 
yet further aspects of the relationship between words and meaning become 
apparent when studied from the perspective of the theory of conceptual 
metaphor associated with Lakoff and Johnson.19 In brief, proponents 
of conceptual metaphor theory consider metaphor not as a trope that is 
necessarily intentional and willed, a departure from normal speech used for 
effect, but rather as a cognitive operation that human beings use in order to 
think about the world and to describe it. Take the normal, apparently non-
metaphorical sentence: 
8. “Penelope went through life full of joy”.
There are many things that can be said about this expression, and it is possible 
to devise a diagram for it:
Fig. 2. “Penelope went through life full of joy”.
17 Martial used a different variation of the metonymy in stating scrinia da magnis, me 
manus una capit (“give bookcases to the great, a single hand can hold me” Mart. 1.2.4). Here, 
the “me” referred to is a book.
18 For bibliography, see ZANKER (2016).
19 LAKOFF & JOHNSON (2003 [1980]). For a more recent introduction, see 
DANCYGIER & SWEETSER (2014).
104 - PHAOS
©  rev. estud. class.    Campinas, SP    v.18n.1     p.97-118     jan./jun. 2018 ©  rev. estud. class.    Campinas, SP    v.18n.1     p.97-118     jan./jun. 2018
First, there is a human subject (a trajector) that has moved “through” 
a container (a landmark), i.e. life.20 It is evident that she is outside of the 
container because of the use of the past tense verb (“went”). Indeed, Penelope 
herself is described as a container, in that she is characterized as being “full of 
joy”: joy is radiating out to fill Penelope’s body. Most importantly, movement 
through life is being described in terms of movement through space (“went”). 
Nor is this a one-off transference. In their early publications, Lakoff and 
Johnson stressed the prevalence of the conceptual metaphor life is a journey 
throughout English – the conventional “mapping” yields numerous different 
expressions. For instance, the following sentences are perfectly intelligible: 
9. “Penelope had many obstacles in her path”.
10. “Penelope’s end [i.e. her death] was swift”. 
In a number of languages (but by no means in all), the verb “to go” 
has been turned into a marker for the future tense – speakers of English, for 
instance, say “I am going to be like Penelope”. And the life is a journey 
metaphor is, incidentally, clearly apparent Latin – compare basic terms such 
as exitus (“departure” > “death”), which suggests that the subject has passed 
through (or is passing out of ) the container of existence/life.
These two conceptual structures – the container and the path – are 
fundamental to human cognition and its expression in language, and serve 
as the bases for countless types of conceptualization and description. These 
highly physical notions, mentally abstracted in a set of structural relationships 
that some scholars term an Image Schema,21 are transferred to describe a raft 
of different non-concrete entities and processes. It has already been noted 
how both are activated in our description of Penelope’s passage through life, 
but they are highly prominent when it comes to descriptions of reading and 
meaning as well. The point is banal when it comes to reading – besides notions 
of “reading deeply” as opposed to “skimming” a text, which rely on depth, or 
those that pertain to “struggling” or “wrestling” with a difficult book, which 
cast the book in terms of an opponent, speakers regularly talk about “going 
through” a work of literature or “struggling through” a book (where the book 
appears to offer resistance or impede the reader).22
When it comes to the issue of meaning, however, let us turn to the 
container structure first of all: while it has been much debated and questioned 
20 For “trajector” and “landmark” in cognitive linguistics, see e.g. LANGACKER (1987, 
2008).
21 For Image Schemas, of which there will be no further mention in this paper, see the 
early contributions of LAKOFF (1987); JOHNSON (1987); LAKOFF & JOHNSON (1999).
22 See the points made in the Introduction.
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since Reddy’s early exposition,23 the concept (container) is a particularly 
prominent way of discussing the relationship between words (form) and ideas 
(meaning). Consider the following phrases:
11. “I could not put it into words”. 
12. “The contents of the statement”.
13. “I got a lot out of that statement”. 
Here, one is either putting an object (i.e. meaning) into a container or, 
conversely, retrieving the object from the container. 
Fig. 3. The “container” metaphor
When words are “meaningful”, they are “full of meaning”, i.e. “pregnant”, 
whereas “meaningless” words are “empty” or “vain”. At times, the content of 
the words seems to be characterized in different ways; the notion of “getting 
a lot out” of someone’s statement suggests that the meaning is a disaggregated 
substance or a fluid that fills the words, whereas the idea of “pregnant” words 
suggests a unified body within the container that can be extracted as a unit.24 
In any event, the container metaphor can be misleading, as it may suggest that 
exactly the same semantic “content”, i.e. the same idea or meaning, will be 
extracted from the word as was put into it – a notion that is of course absurd 
to anyone who has actually experienced communication:25 meanings are not 
preserved as unified entities within word-packages. In any case, the container 
metaphor is systematic and firmly embedded in English, and is reflected in a 
significant number of other natural languages. 
23 On the original framing of the “conduit metaphor”, see REDDY (1979); for rejoinders, 
see e.g. KRZESZOWSKI (1997); GRADY (1998). DANCYGIER & SWEETSER (2014), call 
it the COMMUNICATION IS EXCHANGE OF OBJECTS metaphor. In this paper, the 
term “container” will be used to refer to the metaphor.
24 On the different ways in which the ideas “within” words can be characterized, see 
KZRESZOWSKI (1997), p. 1617.
25 On this, and other mismatches between the situation suggested by the metaphor and 
the realities of communication, see REDDY (1979).
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It is definitely reflected in Latin – take, for instance, expressions such as 
the following, again from the opening of Plautus’ Menaechmi:
14. quam potero in uerba conferam paucissuma
“I shall put it [i.e. the plot of the play] into as few words as possible” (Plaut. 
Men. 6).
Here, the metaphor of words as containers is used to high effect, as the 
speaker of the prologue literally stuffs the plot of the play into the individual 
words. The speaker wants to use as few words as possible, and so we are 
presented with a scenario in which a minimal number of word-packages 
are “filled” with the argumentum (“plot of the play”). But the conceptual 
metaphor is also behind such everyday Latin expressions as the simple uerbis 
(“in words”), where there is no motion involved – the idea is simply “in” 
the words (the term standing in the ablative rather than accusative). In such 
expressions, meaning is put into the word-containers from outside and is 
preserved within them until it is time for it to be retrieved.
It is rare, however, to find items of any importance in human culture 
characterized by a single metaphor; take the idea of time, for example, a 
notion that has already been observed to be metaphorically structured by the 
frame of space. On the one hand, one can “go through life”, or “encounter 
problems along the way”, where the human subject is characterized as moving 
along a road. On the other hand, there is a contrasting metaphor whereby 
things or events are thought of as approaching the human subject; compare 
the following sentences:26
15. “We are approaching Christmas”.
16. “Christmas is approaching”.
In these sentences, two different metaphors for time are in play to 
communicate the same idea; why there should be two different types 
of expression is a good question, although it may be noted that the two 
metaphors are structurally inverted when it comes to the attribution of agency 
– in the first, it is the human agent who is moving, while in the second it is 
the event itself. It is likely that the differing attribution of agency is useful for 
communicators – the notion of Christmas approaching takes the power from 
26 For abundant Latin examples of these metaphors, see SHORT (2016).
PHAOS - 107
©  rev. estud. class.    Campinas, SP    v.18n.1     p.97-118     jan./jun. 2018 ©  rev. estud. class.    Campinas, SP    v.18n.1     p.97-118     jan./jun. 2018
the human subject, ascribes a threatening aspect to the event (Christmas), and 
thus increases the urgency of the situation.27
The container metaphor of meaning may also be reversed by apparently, 
at least, switching the figure with the ground. It has already been demonstrated 
that Roman authors could describe putting meanings into words, yet things 
could, as in English and Portuguese, also be said “in the same meaning” or “no 
mesmo sentido”. Compare the following:
17. non solum in eodem sensu sed etiam in diuerso eadem uerba contra sumuntur
“Words may be opposed not only when used in the same sense, but in a 
different sense”  (Quint. Inst. 9.3.36).
18. aliter quoque uoces aut eaedem diuersa in significatione ponuntur 
“In other ways as well the same words can be used [lit. placed] in a different 
meaning” (Quint. Inst. 9.3.69).
The force of the ablatives is locatival. From these examples it appears that 
the container metaphor of meaning takes two distinct forms in Latin – in the 
first, meaning is said to exist in words, while in the second words are said to 
exist in the meaning:
Fig. 4. Word and meaning
In both cases the language used is highly physical – it involves the notions 
of placing, setting, and locating. In order to describe something that humans 
cannot see or point to – i.e. the relationship between meaning and words – 
numerous natural languages (including Latin) structure the relationship with 
reference to physical space. 
The latter form of the metaphor (where words are described as being “in” 
meanings) is, however, in actual fact a variation of the ideas are locations 
27 For other explanations, see e.g. MCGLONE & HARDING (1998); BORODITSKY 
& RAMSCAR (2002).
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metaphor in Latin. The following examples are offered by Short, who has 
investigated such expressions at length:28
19. qui consilium iniere…
“Those who have entered into [i.e. formulated] the plan…” (Plaut. Capt. 493).
20. quo timore perterriti Galli… consilio destiterunt 
“The Gauls, terrified by this fear…, stood away from [i.e. ceased from] their 
plan” (Caes. BGall. 7.26.5).
21. ea omnes stant sententia 
“All stand by [i.e. in] that opinion” (Plaut. Curc. 250).
22. haud magna mole Piso promptus ferocibus in sententiam trahitur 
“Without much difficulty, Piso, always ready for violent action, was dragged 
into [i.e. compelled to adopt] this view” (Tac. Ann. 2.78).
Here, ideas are described as locations into which one enters, within 
which one is located, or from which one  departs. On other occasions, one 
may be “dragged” into an idea or attitude by another, or kept away from it in 
other cases. The cases (e.g. accusative of direction) and prefixes/prepositions 
(e.g. in, de, ab) help to structure the relationship between the trajector and the 
location he or she is entering. Short has linked the metaphor to the Roman 
notion of the memory palace, where each item to be remembered is set in its 
own location in a fictional site.29 The words-in-meaning metaphor is built 
on top of such notions, in that the word is “taken up” or “set down” in (in) a 
sense-location (consider once again phrases such as those in excerpts 17 and 
18, e.g. in diuersa significatione ponuntur).
Yet there are further variations on the ideas are locations metaphor; 
one might, for example, turn to the related notion whereby words are placed 
“on top” of their meanings, and the meanings are said to “lie beneath” words; 
consider the following:
23. quemadmodum uocabula essent imposita rebus in lingua Latina, sex libris 
exponere institui…
“I have begun to set out in six books how words have been set upon things in 
the Latin language” (Varro, Ling. 5.1).
28 SHORT (2008).
29 On the memory palace, see e.g. BLUM (1969); SMALL (1997).
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24. …quod debeat subesse res quae designetur 
“…that there is something underneath [the words] that is to be designated” 
(Varro, Ling. 9.37).
The res, or object to which the word refers, figuratively lies “under” 
the word that serves as the marker. Words are “set on top” of things by an 
impositor (“setter”, “planter”),30 such that grammarians like Varro (from whose 
De lingua Latina the previous excerpts are taken) could expand the metaphor, 
on several occasions, to describe the derivation of words in terms of a tree; the 
following is only one such example:
25. duo enim genera uerborum, unum fecundum, quod declinando multas ex se 
parit disparilis formas, ut est lego legi legam, sic alia, alterum genus sterile, quod 
ex se parit nihil, ut est et iam uix cras magis cur.
“There are two types of words – one fertile, which by bending down gives 
birth from itself to many different/unlike forms, e.g. lego ‘I collect’, legi ‘I 
have collected’, legam ‘I shall collect’; and another type that is sterile, which 
gives birth to nothing from itself, e.g. et ‘and’, iam ‘now’, uix ‘scarcely’, cras 
‘tomorrow’, magis ‘more’, cur ‘why’” (Varro, Ling. 8.9).
Fertile words – e.g. the verb lego – can be conjugated or declined (Varro 
uses the term declinare for both operations) whereas indeclinables such as iam 
or magis are sterile. The situation can be described in a diagram (where the 
left and right halves represent “sterile” and “fertile” word trees respectively):
Fig. 5. Varro’s word tree at Ling. 8.9.
30 Cf. cum haec amminicula addas ad eruendum uoluntatem impositoris, tamen latent multa 
(“Although you supply these tools for the purpose of unearthing the intent of the planter, 
nevertheless many things remain hidden” Varro, Ling. 7.2).
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There is much to say about Varro’s word trees and there is no space to go 
into them in depth here.31 Suffice it to say that the image of the tree is used 
in different ways in Varro’s De lingua Latina, and the various usages are not 
coherent with each other. In the previous excerpt (25), at least, the polymath 
is capitalizing on terms such as sterilis and fecundus (“sterile” and “fertile”), 
as he does elsewhere on the metaphorical potential of the grammatical term 
declinare (“lean away”, i.e. “decline”), in order to describe the process of 
word derivation by means of a visual analogy. Elsewhere, Varro reinforces 
the image by using the terms casus (“falling”, i.e. “case”), radix (“root”), and 
ramus (“branch”). In the above example (25), in “natural declension” the 
derived forms of a word (e.g. legam and legi  - the choice of term is perhaps 
suggestive) “lean away” from the trunk. The Latin language may be thought 
of as a field on which name-givers have “planted” names in order to designate 
the res (“things”), or at least ideas of things, that lie under them: the ideas are 
locations metaphor interacts here with an agricultural metaphor in order to 
offer a peculiarly Roman way of understanding language.
3. PATHS
This article opened with a discussion of how the text is frequently 
described as if it were animate in Latin (as it is in the modern languages), 
and continued with a description of how the notions of the container and 
location are metaphorically prominent in our descriptions of speech. It is 
now necessary to return to an equally important physical notion noteworthy 
in descriptions of reading, meaning, and communication in general – that 
of the path. Take the following expression from Cicero’s De finibus, where 
Cicero is criticizing a statement made by his collocutor, Piso:
26. “tria genera bonorum”: procliui currit oratio. uenit ad extremum; haeret in 
salebra; cupit enim dicere nihil posse ad beatam uitam deesse sapienti.
“‘[There are] three classes of goods’: the phrase runs smoothly. When it arrives 
at the end, it comes to a halt at the rough patch [in the road]; for it wishes to 
say that that nothing for a happy life can be lacking to the wise man” (Cic. 
Fin. 5.84).
In English one speaks of a phrase “going” or “running”, while in 
Portuguese one talks of “uma expressão corrente” or of “uma conversa fluente”. 
The Ciceronian currit oratio reflects the way a spoken expression is enunciated 
31 On Varro’s word trees, see in particular GITNER (2014).
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through time, such that it can be described in terms of movement through 
space: 
Fig. 6. Diagram of the scenario depicted at Cic. Fin. 5.84.
The previous sentence (26) is of course interesting for other reasons that 
should be apparent from what has already been said – just like Penelope, the 
expression goes along and comes to an end, yet over and above this it “wishes 
to say something”. Written discourse can also be thought of as “running across” 
a page by the metaphor form is motion (“fictive motion”).32 Consider terms 
such as the Greek στίχος and Latin uersus: στίχος, which came to mean “line 
of poetry”, had the earlier meaning of “column” or “file” of soldiers in Homer 
(from στείχω, “march”), whereas uersus (“line of poetry”) had the prior 
meaning of “the turning of the plough at the end of the furrow”.33
Yet there is a further way in which directionality plays a role in discussions 
of speech, and this pertains to neither (1) the time-bound nature of physically 
enunciated words nor (2) the movement of words depicted on the page, but 
rather to (3) the direction that the text is going in terms of its meaning.34 Some 
of the most important modern verbs and nouns of reference and meaning, for 
example, are in fact derived from terms for carrying, stretching, going, and 
other forms of implicit motion. Examples in English include the phrase “the 
drift of the statement”, where the noun “drift” seems to configure meaning 
32 For a brief introduction to fictive motion, where a static entity is said to e.g. “go” 
or “stretch” (“the highway runs through the mountains”), see MATLOCK & BERGMANN 
(2015). See originally TALMY (2000), p. 171, who analyzes the phenomenon in terms of 
the “mapping of motion as a source domain onto stationariness as a target domain”; contrast 
LANGACKER (2008), pp. 528-531: “through subjectification, the dynamicity inherent in the 
apprehension of events is transferred to the conception of static scenes”; LAKOFF & TURNER 
(1989), pp. 143-144, posit that the phraseology is prompted a conceptual metaphor FORM IS 
MOTION; see also KÖVECSES (2015), pp. 18-19.
33 BEEKES (2010), s.v. στείχω: “στίχος [m.] ‘file, rank’, of soldiers, trees, etc., often of 
words, ‘line’ in verse and prose…”; ERNOUT & MEILLET (1959) s.v. uerto: “«fait de tourner 
la charrue au bout du sillon, tour, ligne»; puis concret «sillon»; par analogie «ligne d’écriture» 
(d’abord écrite βουστροφηδόν, comme dans l’inscription du Forum), et spécialement «vers»”.
34 See SHORT (2008, 2013a). The verb pertineo (“refer”, “concern”) is often used in this 
way: e.g. quorsum… haec oratio pertinet? (“to what does my speech refer?” Cic., Dom. 115).
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in terms of the statement’s movement; the endpoint of that movement can of 
course be conceptualized as the statement’s “aim” or “goal”.35
This latter type of motion, the movement of a human or a text towards a 
meaning (via the source-path-goal metaphor), supplied a Latin vocabulary 
that was key to subsequent discussions of meaning. Take the following 
instance, where an expression is “twisted away” from its normal course towards 
a depraved meaning: 
27. mala consuetudine in obscenum intellectum sermo detortus est, ut ‘ductare 
exercitus’ et ‘patrare bellum’…
“A phrase [may be] twisted away into an obscene meaning by wicked usage, 
as in the examples of ‘lead armies’ and ‘finish off battle’” (Quint. Inst. 8.3.44).
The phrases “lead armies” and “finish off battle” have taken on untoward 
meanings: ductare exercitus plays on the two meanings of ducto, i.e. “lead 
[an army]” and “take home [a prostitute]”, while patrare bellum is likewise 
ambiguous, as it can be used for reaching sexual climax. Here, the verb 
detorqueo (“twist away”) is employed to describe the deviation of the phrase 
from its proper path:
Fig. 7. Diagram of the scenario depicted at Quint. Inst. 8.3.44.
Here, a phrase originally moves along a figurative path towards its goal, 
but then is acted upon so that it moves towards a different goal (meaning).36
The metaphor played a role when it came to the development of specific 
pieces of Latin terminology: the term intentio, which of course gave rise to 
the English term “intend” (Portuguese: “pretender”), offers a good example 
of this process. The Latin verb tendere (“to stretch”) yielded a number of verbs 
that were important to the Latin vocabulary for what things meant. While the 
35 To take a related metaphor, one can also speak of what a statement or phrase “brings” to 
us, as in “the import of the oracle” or “the bearing of the phrase”. Cf. e.g. non ego celari possum, 
quid nutus amantis  | quidue ferant miti lenia uerba sono (“I am not able to mistake as to what the 
nods of the lover or the soft words with their mild ring mean” Tib. 1.8.1-2); nescioquid peccati 
portat haec purgatio (“this excusing implies some kind of crime” Ter. Haut. 625).
36 Cf. uereor ne illud grauius Phaedria | tulerit neue aliorsum atque ego feci acceperit… 
(“I fear that Phaedria has taken it badly and has interpreted it in a different way from what I 
intended” Ter. Eun. 81-82).
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verb is derived from an inherited root for “stretching”,37 the basic form tendere 
could also take on the sense of “to go” or “to strive”:
28. fratresque tendentes… 
 Pelion imposuisse Olympo 
“…the brothers striving to place Pelion on top of Olympus” (Hor. Carm. 
3.4.51).
The verb had a number of prefixed forms (e.g. intendere, ostendere, and 
portendere), but to concentrate on intendere one may note how the idea of 
stretching gave rise to a sense that implies movement:
29. quo nunc primum intendam? 
“In what direction shall I strive?” (Ter. An. 343).38
This instance involves actual physical movement, but the “striving” also 
clearly relates to the speaker’s will/volition, as it does the previous example 
from Horace (28). In addition, the verb could be used purely of mental 
intentions; Plautus, for instance, used it to describe what a human being 
intends or wants to do:
30. pergin, sceleste, intendere hanc arguere?
“Do you continue, scoundrel, to intend to accuse her?” (Plaut. Mil. 380).39
Generally, this last sense of the verb was reserved for animate beings, 
i.e. things with minds that could “intend” things, but sentences such as 
the following from Lucretius, where the verb intendere is used of inanimate 
entities, nevertheless existed:
31. quod facere intendunt facere, neque adhuc conata patrantur.
“…which they [heat and sun] seek to do, but do not yet gain their end” (Lucr. 
5.385).
Moreover, the verb could occasionally serve to articulate the meaning of 
phrases and statements, as is clear from the following excerpt from Sallust:
37 See ERNOUT & MEILLET (1959), s.v. tendo. For the idea of stretching in Latin, cf. 
e.g. manus ad caeli caerula templa | tendebam lacrumans (“I was stretching my hands at the sky-
blue vaults of the heavens” Enn. Ann. 48-49 Skutsch).
38 Cf. ut eo quo intendit cum exercitu mature perueniat (“...so that he might swiftly arrive 
with his army to that place to which he has directed his course” Cic. Mur. 22).
39 Cf. hostes undique circumventi... se per munitiones deicere et fuga salutem petere intenderunt 
(“the enemies, having been surrounded from all sides, threw themselves through the defenses 
and tried to seek safety by flight” Caes. BGall. 3.26.5).
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32. igitur ubi Marius haruspicis dicta eodem intendere uidet, quo cupido animi 
hortabatur, ab Metello petundi gratia missionem rogat.
“Therefore when Marius saw that the words of the haruspex tended in the 
same direction as his mind’s desire was encouraging, he asked Metellus for 
leave for the purpose of seeking the consulship” (Sall. Iug. 64).
This is a rare usage, but gives us a glimpse of the way such expressions 
could come to be used of speech: literally, the speech of the priest “tends” in 
the same direction as Marius’ desire. The directional eodem, taken together 
with the quo, would suggest that the usage is to be characterized as dependent 
on the idea of motion – yet not motion through time and space but rather in 
terms of thought. The motion should be construed as the semantic “drift” of 
the dicta – the direction in which the words are tending semantically. 
There is more, in that the word of course developed into a special piece 
of critical vocabulary. The noun intentio (English “intention”, Portuguese 
“intenção”), as described by Donatus (4th century AD) in the preface to his 
commentary on Vergil, seems to correspond with this usage; on the one hand, 
an intentio is ascribed to a poet:
33. ante opus titulus causa intentio. Titulus, in quo quaeritur cuius sit, quid sit; 
causa, unde ortum sit et quare hoc potissimum ad scribendum poeta praesumpserit; 
intentio, in qua cognoscitur, quid efficere conetur poeta 
“Before [dealing with the work itself ], there is the title, the cause, and the 
intention. The title is that in which one asks whose the work is and what it 
is; the cause involves inquiries about its origin and especially why the author 
took to writing it; the intention is that in which one learns what the poet was 
trying to achieve” (Donat. Vit. Verg. 47).
Here, the intentio consists in the direction the author is “striving” with 
regard to his meaning. Later on in the same preface, however, the term intentio 
is applied to a book:
34. intentio libri quam σκοπόν Graeci vocant, in imitatione Theocriti poetae 
constituitur, qui Siculus ac Syracusanus fuit. Est intentio etiam in laude Caesaris 
et principium ceterorum, per quos in sedes suas atque agros rediit, unde effectus 
finisque carminis et delectationem et utilitatem secundum praecepta confecit.
“The intention of the book, which the Greeks call the ‘skopos’, consists in 
the imitation of Theocritus, who was a Sicilian and Syracusan. The intention 
also exists in praising Caesar and the other leaders, with the help of whom he 
returned to his property and fields; on account of this, the accomplishment 
and result of the poem has been to create pleasure and utility in accordance 
with the rules” (Donat. Vit. Verg. 64).
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Interesting here, besides the fact that a human being is not moving or 
stretching here but rather the book itself, is the fact that the term intentio 
is equated with the Greek term σκοπός (Portuguese: “escopo”). This Greek 
noun, derived from σκεπτέομαι (“to look”), can be translated into English 
as “target” or “goal”,40 and therefore relies on a conceptual metaphor similar 
to yet distinct from the Roman one: the movement is described in terms of 
an arrow’s flight (cf. Germ. “eine treffende Aussage”).41 In Latin, however, the 
path metaphor structures meaning as something towards which an entity is 
striving; it is also behind Latin terms such as destinatum (“object aimed at”, 
“goal”, “intention”), finis (“end”), and propositum. To take the last of these, a 
propositum was literally something “set in front of one”; it later morphed into 
the English noun “purpose” (Portuguese: “propósito”). To close this section, a 
visual depiction of the two types of intention mentioned in excerps 33 and 34 
(that of the author and that of his book) might look like the following:
Fig. 8. The intentio of a human agent and of a text.
This situation is not without importance, since the notion that both 
human beings and texts might have an intentio suggests that both might 
be agents – yet texts are not agents in the way that human beings are. The 
situation, however, became a problem in the 20th century, when critics sought 
to remove the author from the interpretative equation. If one seeks the lexical 
polysemies that led to this quandary (repeated in expressions discussed above 
such as sibi uelle), one has to turn to Latin and Greek.42 
CONCLUSION
This article has surveyed – albeit very briefly and only with reference 
to a few examples – how the Latin vocabulary of reading and meaning was 
40 The archery metaphor naturally lies behind English term “scope”, although it has 
become somewhat hidden – compare: “within the scope of the exercise” and “we have to 
broaden the scope of our inquiry”. It is unclear whether many native English speakers are aware 
of the metaphor that motivates this diction.
41 On the differences between the Greek arrow metaphor and the Latin equivalents, see 
SHORT (2013). The Greek term is used by Cicero: Cf. σκοπὸς (hoc est enim) huic nostro nihil 
praebere, illa autem οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο (“his intention (for this is the truth) is to offer no allowance 
to our friend; but the lady says that she will not be παρὰ τοῦτο” Cic. Att. 15.29.2).
42 See ZANKER (2016).
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generated via metaphor. The key term legere (“collect”, “read”), which Varro 
etymologized as “collecting with the eyes” in the 1st century BC,43 has not 
even been touched upon. But even by grazing the surface of the subject, the 
deeply metaphorical nature of conceptions of reading and meaning should be 
clear. First, there is the attribution of human agency and volition to the book; 
second, the words that one reads are described in Latin, as in many other 
languages, as containers from which one extracts meanings or conversely 
terms set in locations; and third, meaning is often described in terms of 
movement in a direction towards a goal. All of these metaphors are derived 
from the embodied state of language users – their status as human beings and 
familiarity with human volition, containers, and movement along paths allow 
them to use these domains to conceptualize and describe less well-delineated 
phenomena.44 Such physical and psychological qualities are fundamental to 
our existence within the world; in order to describe and communicate abstract 
notions, it is natural that vocabulary is transferred from these more concrete 
or well-known domains. 
But why is this important? Why are modes of speech used long ago 
interesting in any meaningful way? Two major reasons are readily apparent 
and have already been referred to throughout this paper. On the one hand, 
establishing the presence of conceptual metaphors in Latin that are shared 
in the modern languages helps the scholar to understand the time-bound 
nature of the modern expressions: modern metaphors are often part of a 
tradition that goes back to antiquity. This is true for English, but it is even 
truer for Portuguese, where there is a strong and unbroken tie with Latin. 
Yet appreciation of this aspect of the relationship between the ancient and 
modern metaphors must be offset by an awareness that certain metaphors 
appear to be prevalent throughout the world’s languages and therefore are not 
solely due to their being passed down within a single tradition; the metaphors 
for time described above (“Christmas is coming” versus “We are approaching 
Christmas”) are attested in a great number of languages.45 Such metaphors 
appear to arise from the ways our minds work, and would therefore seem to 
be beyond the functioning of a tradition. Even in such cases, however, it is 
important to study the ancient languages, since they supply evidence for or 
against the case for universality.
43 O’SULLIVAN (2015), p. 112, has also drawn attention to the way in which the 
verb legere can also refer to movement, both in actuality and on the page. Take the following 
expression from Ovid’s Metamorphoses: nec me studiosius altera saltus | legit (“nor did another 
[nymph] traverse the glades more eagerly” (Ov. Met. 5.578-579). Reading can also be a journey, 
as one passes “through” a text.
44 See, originally, LAKOFF & JOHNSON (2003 [1980]).
45 See e.g. MOORE (2014).
PHAOS - 117
©  rev. estud. class.    Campinas, SP    v.18n.1     p.97-118     jan./jun. 2018 ©  rev. estud. class.    Campinas, SP    v.18n.1     p.97-118     jan./jun. 2018
Yet there is an additional reason to be interested in the classical metaphors 
for reading and meaning. There is a tradition of analytic philosophy going back 
to the later Wittgenstein and his peers in which language, and the metaphors 
contained within language, are viewed as a chief source of philosophical 
problems.46 The phrases “I have a cat in the box” and “I have an idea in mind” 
both appeal to the notion of the container (“in”), but having a cat in a box is 
a very different thing from having an idea in mind. The similar syntax of the 
sentences may suggest to us, however, that an idea is like a cat in certain ways, 
or that a mind is like a box. Such misleading analogies could, according to 
Wittgenstein, confuse us about the world; for him, the task of philosophy was 
to undo the knots created by human agency in language. The metaphors that 
have been surveyed in this paper are connected with long-standing problems 
in philosophy – the relationship between meanings and words (“where is the 
meaning in the words?”), for instance, or the notion of intentionality (“how 
can texts intend things when they are not sentient beings?”). By learning 
about the histories of words and of the conceptual metaphors that originally 
motivated their application, one can guard oneself (somewhat) from the 
prejudices and misconceptions that can arise from taking language at face 
value.47
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